Sherwin published A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance, 8 which emphasized the Soviet factor among many that influenced the decision to bomb Hiroshima. 7 Alperovitz concluded that the primary reason for bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not to end the war with Japan, but, in Byrnes's phrase, to make the Soviets "more manageable." The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power. * In 1965, historian Gar Alperovitz published Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima & Potsdam. Byrnes to end the Pacific War before the Soviet Union's promised entry on 8 th August. According to this "atomic diplomacy" interpretation, Truman was urged on by Secretary of State James F. 6 Blackett concluded that America's use of the bomb had more to do with the early stages of its Cold War against the Soviet Union than with forcing an early Japanese surrender. Blackett, a British Nobel laureate in physics, published Fear, War, and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy. (Nothing similar has occurred in Japan, partly because the government destroyed many of its archives for fear that the materials might be used for war-crimes trials. government archives and private diaries by Truman, Stimson, and their aides. As Hemingway wrote, "Isn't it pretty to think so?"īut since Hiroshima, a "revisionist" view has emerged based on declassified documents from U.S. And it suggests that by obliterating Hiroshima, the bomb actually "saved" lives. This orthodox view suggests a simple cause-and-effect relationship between Hiroshima and Japan's surrender eight days later. Several histories support this interpretation, 4 which remains popular because it offers both simplicity and morality. In America, this "orthodox" view of Hiroshima holds that the city's destruction was necessary to end the war and save lives. 2 Truman's justification was reinforced in a 1947 Harper's Magazine article about "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" by his former Secretary of War, Henry L. In time, the bomb's benefits grew - to a million casualties spared, then to "millions of lives" saved. Only later did Truman and his advisors assert that the bomb was used to spare the American lives that might have been lost had the Allies been forced to invade the Japanese home islands. They have been repaid many fold." 1 Thus, Truman defined Hiroshima as a military event and justified one act of barbarism with another. In his first public announcement, on 6 th August 1945, Truman said that "the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare" had been dropped "on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base." Truman added, "The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor. And from the very beginning, President Truman made their task easier.
The victors in the Pacific War have found much to celebrate about Hiroshima. It may seem that most history is written about victories, but many cultures also thrive by remembering - even venerating - their past defeats. With Hiroshima as our example, I would answer, both the victors and the victims. My historian friends in Hungary like to say that "The past is less certain than the future." They have in mind their nation's constantly revisionist history, but the remark has special significance for Hiroshima as well, and may help us to answer those three questions. Three weeks later, an A-bomb destroyed Hiroshima. President Harry S Truman toured war-torn Berlin on 16 th July 1945, he looked at the rubble left by Allied bombing and remarked, ".I fear that the machines are ahead of morals by some centuries." And in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam that evening, Truman received word from home that the world's first atomic bomb had just been tested. Hiroshima raises many profound questions about how the Twentieth Century will be remembered: Who defines world culture? How do we treat our cultural heritage? Who remembers what, and for which purpose?Īs U.S. Reason and Circumstances of the Hiroshima Bombīy William Lanouette, Ph.